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Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal 
economies 
 
Abstract 
Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to 
social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and 
Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers 
important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the 
potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data 
from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma framework to explain 
why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in 
two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance 
understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This article considers the multi-level institutional governance interface (Jackson and Deeg, 2012) 
between European public policy, national level legal transposition, and employment relations 
responses by organizational level actors, regarding the impact of the EU “Information and 
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Consultation Directive” (2002/14/EC) on employee voice in the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) 
of the United Kingdom (UK) and Republic of Ireland (RoI). The impact of the ICD on employer 
decision-making powers and employee voice rights is an important and under-researched area. 
Employee voice at work also relates to the extent of what the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) terms ‘representation security’.  
 
The article advances theory and empirical contributions concerning policy and practice regarding 
worker participation rights, utilising the prisoner’s dilemma concept in game theory. The few 
existing studies of the ICD offer substantial empirical insights about diffusion and emerging 
practice (Taylor et al., 2009; Authors1; Hall et al., 2013, 2015). But extant research does not 
provide sufficient theoretical conceptualization to explain why the Directive has been largely 
ineffective in LME contexts in providing employee voice. Important ILO indicators of 
‘representation security’ regarding employee voice provision are the effectiveness of the legal and 
regulatory framework for diffusing voice, as well as the existence at organizational level of 
collective representative bodies to which workers can belong to and have a say in at work. This 
article seeks to contribute to knowledge by assessing why the EU ICD and the transposed national 
employee voice regulations in the UK and Ireland have failed to generate ‘representation security’ 
and sustainable mutual gains cooperation at the micro level.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Three explanatory theoretical propositions are advanced in a 
metaphorical sense in the literature review to explain why minimalist macro regulatory design has 
inhibited mutual gain outcomes at workplace level: (P1) regulatory design faults with the ICD itself 
and how it has been transposed nationally through employee information and consultation 
regulations in LME contexts restricts social dialogue and mutual trust regarding voice 
arrangements; (P2) the extent of mutual gains outcomes is likely to be minimal owing to such 
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institutional design faults, and game theory is scrutinised to help understand why this is so; and 
(P3), perceived uncertainty of outcomes means that mutual gains cooperation is likely to be too 
much of a high risk strategy for management and employees to engage in robust and enduring 
employee voice regimes. These three propositions are assessed in section 4 with data from sixteen 
case study organisations, using insights from game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma concept in 
labour economics (Leibenstein, 1982; Trif and Brady, 2013). Finally, the discussion assesses the 
empirical data against the propositions, and identifies social policy implications for (re)regulation of 
I&C rights. 
 
Employment regulation of I&C in liberal economies 
The Information & Consultation Regulations 
The European Commission had three explicit social policy rationales underpinning the ICD: to 
establish minimum standards of I&C enshrined in legislation across the EU; to strengthen the 
efficacy of national I&C legislation (stemming from the Renault Vilvoorde case); and finally, to 
improve synergies with other related Directives, such as European Works Councils and collective 
redundancies (European Commission, 2013). It was perceived that the ICD would have greatest 
public policy impact in the UK and RoI as they were the only two European Union (EU) member 
states at the time of its inception lacking general legislation on employee voice rights (Authors4; 
Hall et al., 2013, 2015). In comparison, some other EU states like Germany had a history of 
statutory backing for works councils (Hassel, 2014). 
 
The EU Directive (2002/14/EC) was introduced with the express intention to promote ‘social 
dialogue and mutual trust between management and labour’ (European Commission, 2013). It 
requested member states to introduce permanent general arrangements to encourage management 
support for workplace dialogue in three broad areas: i) provide ‘information’ pertaining to the 
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economic situation of companies; ii) enable ‘information and consultation’ concerning threats to 
employment; and iii), ‘inform and consult employees, with a view to reaching agreement’, on 
decisions linked to changes in work organisation or contractual arrangements.  
 
But after many years in gestation having being first raised by the European Commission in 1995, 
the ‘soft’ ‘watered down’ design of the ICD that finally emerged at EU-level in 2002, and its 
subsequent minimalist transposition though national-level regulations in LMEs (UK and Ireland), 
has militated against effective social dialogue and mutual trust in organizations (Authors, 2014). In 
large part, this is because EU-led regulation has gravitated from ‘harder’ laws (such as equal pay 
and health & safety) towards ‘softer’ lighter touch measures allowing member states greater latitude 
to transpose arrangements fitting national industrial relations cultures (Streeck, 1995; Gold, 2010). 
What distinguishes emerging EU social policy is its ‘low capacity to impose binding obligations on 
market participants, and the high degree to which it depends on various kinds of voluntarism .. in 
the name of self-regulation’ (Streeck, 1995: 45-49). Regarding the ICD, the ‘soft’ rules adopted at 
EU-level had already done much to stall any momentum on employee voice rights emerging at 
national level. In particular, the Directive left it open to national governments to decide whether nor 
not to adopt an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ approach to transposition. The ‘opt-in’ option means that an 
employer only has to set up an IC structure if formally asked to do so by a group of employees. In 
contrast, choosing an ‘opt-out’ approach would mean that every employer falling under the scope of 
the Directive would be obliged to put an IC structure in place unless employees made it clear they 
were not interested. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Directive (2002/14/EC) gives national 
governments great scope for variability of IC arrangements: ‘The practical arrangements for 
information and consultation shall be defined and implemented in accordance with national law and 
industrial relations practices in individual Member States in such a way as to ensure their 
effectiveness’. Likewise, under Article 5, actors in each Member State are free to develop 
customized arrangements - such as direct communication channels between management and 
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employees - that differ from the stronger fall-back Standard Rules on elected employee 
representatives contained in Article 4; on the proviso that employees are in agreement with 
continuation of direct arrangements.  
  
The import of these ‘soft’ EU-level IC regulations has been influenced by extensive behind the 
scenes lobbying at EU level by governments (notably the UK and Ireland) and employer 
associations, in order to restrict the potential impact of employment regulations on business 
decisions. Such lobbying adds an important political narrative which signals the ubiquitous ‘re-
regulation’ of employment rights. Within the context of a wider neo-liberal project, attempts to 
deregulate workplace rights through lobbying involves extensive regulatory rules transposed from 
transnational to national levels to ensure minimal impact from I&C laws (Authors, 2014). 
Consequently, facilitated by the very general and permissive nature of the Directive itself, both the 
UK and Irish governments transposed the ICD in a ‘light touch’ manner befitting their ‘national 
customs’ (voluntarism, managerial prerogative). In the UK, while the Confederation of British 
Industry opposed collective worker rights, transposition was relatively uncomplicated: for the first 
time, a tripartite agreement was struck between the UK government, CBI and Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) (Hall et al., 2013, 2015). In the RoI, however, events were more controversial, 
because employers and government wanted to prevent legislation advancing mandatory collective 
voice systems perceived to jeopardize inward investment by (non-union) US multinationals, upon 
which the country is heavily reliant (Lavelle et al., 2010).  
 
The UK and RoI legislation is similar but not identical. The ICE Regulations (2004) in the UK, and 
the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act (2006) in RoI, are both minimalist 
procedures, for two main reasons. First, both provide significant scope for employers to implement 
their own customised direct (individualised) I&C, instead of, or alongside indirect (collective) 
dialogue via ‘employee representatives’. Second, the transposed legislation adopts the ‘opt-in’ route 
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permitted by the Directive - defining employee rights to I&C as an elective and not automatic right 
available to all workers. Thus, management do not need to take action or change policy unless 10% 
of their employees actively ‘trigger’ statutory procedures (in Ireland this is capped at 100 
employees and 2500 in the UK). The ‘opt-in’ process is in practice a hurdle many employees will 
find difficult to jump, especially for those already denied union representation, and/or fearing 
employer reprisals (Authors3). In reality, therefore, it appears easy for employers to customize their 
own preferred organisation-specific direct communications practices, and avoid the stronger fall 
back rules on employee representation.  
 
The themes of degree, level and scope of employee information and consultation are validated 
instruments that will be drawn upon to test Proposition 1 below (Marchington and Suter, 2013). 
Degree of I&C considers the extent to which employees and/or their representatives influence and 
share management decisions, ranging from basic one-way information provision and two-way 
communication at one end to codetermination at the other end of an escalating scale. Most I&C 
gravitates towards the bottom of the escalator; often a mix of information dissemination, two-way 
communication, and possibly elements of informal consultation (Authors5). Level refers to where 
I&C occurs: task, team, workplace, establishment, division, headquarters. Marchington and Suter 
(2013) note that while I&C can exist at corporate headquarters level in multinationals – worker 
directors on boards, for instance – it mostly occurs at lower levels. Scope refers to the range of 
issues over which employees have some say (Authors5). This may vary considerably from quite 
trivial ‘tea and toilet’ type issues (canteen menus, office layout), up to sharing power over strategy 
at board level. 
 
Research assessing the design and transposition of I&C regulation is still not widespread. 
Comparative research on employee participation across Europe found that flexibilities built into the 
ICD varied according to national legislation and particular customs (Hall and Purcell, 2011). 
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Further, using international comparative data, Brewster et al., (2014) express concern about the 
functionality of liberal varieties of capitalism to generate effective workplace collaboration. This 
liberal regulatory approach, coupled with narrow scope, low level and shallow depth of I&C 
practices, means the Directive’s impact is likely to fall short of its proclaimed transnational 
(European) public policy intent to diffuse social dialogue and mutual trust in organizations. This is 
potentially most evident in the UK and RoI, where there is little uptake of I&C arrangements, legal 
rights for workers have to be triggered, and there is great scope for enterprise-variable direct 
communication, as opposed to deeper forms of representative participation. Hall and Purcell (2011) 
note that countries with higher coverage of I&C bodies - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands - tend to have mature embedded I&C systems that can be technically 
mandatory.  
 
Much existing literature suggests that minimalist institutional design of implementing legislation at 
European and national level has limited functionality of I&C at micro-level in liberal economies, in 
terms of capacity to diffuse power-sharing voice (Taylor et al., 2009; Koukiadaki, 2010; Hall et al., 
2013, 2015; Brewster et al., 2014). However, such studies do not offer theoretical explanations of 
why regulations fail to generate mutual gains. Hall et al., (2013) show that, following 
implementation of the UK’s ICE Regulations, employee voice in British firms has been designed 
primarily on managements’ terms: while a minority of cases were categorized as ‘active consulters’, 
most were ‘communicators’. Beyond providing a catalyst for managerial moves to introduce I&C, 
impact of the UK ICE Regulations was deemed largely peripheral and diluted. Elsewhere, Taylor et 
al., (2009) question the capacity of the ICE Regulations to influence redundancy outcomes, while 
Koukiadaki (2010:366) concludes that ‘much work remains to be done on the ways in which such 
information and consultation arrangements can evolve as effective mechanisms for the exercise of 
the ‘voice’ rights that the Directive confers’. Proposition 1 has been formulated from the discussion 
above: 
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P1: The intent of the EU ICD is to diffuse social dialogue and mutual trust at work. However, the 
‘degree, level and scope’ of employee voice falls short of this intent because of the permissive 
design of the Directive itself and minimalist transposition of national I&C laws in LMEs, in 
particular.  
 
Game theory and asymmetric outcomes 
The discussion now considers how regulatory design faults with the Directive and transposed 
national laws in LMEs may inhibit mutual gains outcomes, and how this can be conceptualized. 
When considered in the LME contexts of the UK and RoI, the prisoner’s dilemma problem in game 
theory shows why two parties might not cooperate in pursuit of mutual gains outcomes, even if it 
actually might be mutually beneficial to do so (Leibenstein, 1982; Aoki, 1984; Freeman and Lazear, 
1995; Trif and Brady, 2013). Albert Tucker ‘officially’ coined the term ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, with 
the following example of prison sentence outcomes (see Poundstone, 1992): two suspects from a 
criminal gang are imprisoned on a bank robbery charge. The police do not have enough evidence to 
convict the pair on the principal charge, but plan to sentence both to one year in prison on a lesser 
charge. However, the police offer each prisoner a deal simultaneously: if they testify against their 
partner, they will go free, but the partner will get ten years in prison on the main charge. But there is 
a catch. If both prisoners decide to testify against each other, both will receive a five year sentence. 
The crux of the theory is whether cooperation and trust between the partners in crime can generate 
more mutually beneficial win-win outcomes collectively (e.g. one year sentence each). However, if 
there is mistrust of the others’ perceived intentions, then pursuing individual self-interest will 
prevail, causing both prisoners to betray the other, the result being a lose-lose outcome (e.g. five 
year sentence each).  
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Applying the prisoner’s dilemma concept to employment relations, the combination of decisions by 
the two parties as to whether to cooperate or not by sharing power and information can influence 
perceived outcomes and expected benefits for both parties – in terms of the degree to which their 
material interests are realized. Management decisions tend to be linked to the desired outcome of 
efficiently maximizing profit, while employee decisions are linked to more multi-faceted outcomes 
like pay, work conditions and voice (Leibenstein, 1982; Aoki, 1984; Trif and Brady, 2013).  
Leibenstein (1982) applied game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma concept to cooperative 
workplace relations, identifying frequent adversarial outcomes in liberal market regimes due to 
problems of mistrust with regard to dominant choices of employer-employee non-cooperation; at 
the expense of reducing mutual gains. According to Leibenstein, sharing information and 
productivity gains would generally seem to be an area of mutual benefit. Yet in reality it often 
involves a prisoner’s dilemma, due to uncertainty about the other parties’ intentions. In LME 
contexts particularly, either or both individual parties may pursue maximization of their own short-
term self-interest rather than choose collective longer-term mutually beneficial options; especially 
where there are power imbalances. For example, regarding voice, employees may be reluctant to 
share discretionary knowledge with employers if they believe there would be no gain in doing so, or 
even that to do so might harm their interests. Employee withholding of knowledge can damage 
productivity because employment contracts are incomplete and indeterminate: employers cannot 
precisely specify all employee contributions (Baldamus, 1961). Employers, meanwhile, are unlikely 
to share sufficient information and power to provide optimum employee voice unless compelled to 
do so, choosing to preserve managerial prerogative. Liebenstein (1982) observes that a prisoner’s 
dilemma is a zero-sum game (one parties’ gain equals the other’s loss) if the equilibrium falls where 
all individual players (employers and workers) are worse off than they would be if they cooperate 
collectively for mutual gains purposes.  
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Given the limitations of applying positivist scientific personnel economic approaches to labour 
relations (see Spencer, 2012), it is important to note that the prisoner’s dilemma concept cannot 
exhaustively predict that complex social relations in organizations will definitively produce 
particular (and consistent) choices and outcomes, because there are a multitude of causal contextual 
variables shaping outcomes. Nevertheless, it offers a useful metaphorical analytical tool for 
understanding tendencies towards or away from cooperative choices of actors under particular 
contextual conditions, and provides a benchmark against which real practice can be assessed (cf. 
Edwards, 2003:22, 2012). Accordingly, Table 1 below is intended to illustrate ideal-type patterns or 
tendencies towards cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for employers (E) and workers (W), 
while recognizing that in reality patterns may be mixed and changeable given the complexities of 
managing the contradictions of conflict and cooperation in organizations (Edwards, 2003, 2012; 
Spencer, 2012). Table 1 draws on Leibenstein’s (1982) prisoner’s dilemma pay-off matrix, adapting 
it for this article. Pay-offs from all four general patterns/tendencies are indicated below and in the 
table boxes, with gains and losses for employers (E) and workers (W). Exemplar empirical cases are 
listed below to illustrate each. 
Box 1-mutual gains cooperation: Both employers and workers have chosen to cooperate 
collectively for mutual gains. Employers behave in a ‘golden rule’ cooperative manner, provide 
robust employee voice and good pay and employment conditions, and do not pursue profit 
maximization to its extreme. Employees also behave reciprocally in a ‘golden rule’ manner, being 
committed to the firm and willing to release discretionary information to management. A classic 
case fitting in box 1 could be Rubinstein and Kochan (2000), Learning from Saturn. 
Box 2-employer adversarialism: Employers choose to pursue their individual utility of cost 
minimization and/or profit maximization at the expense of workers, who follow the golden rule in 
the (mistaken) belief management will reciprocate with cooperation. Here employers choose an 
individualist adversarial approach to maximize power advantage, emphasize effort intensification, 
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provide weak voice and drive down pay and conditions. Management gains at workers’ expense. A 
classic case fitting in box 2 could be Grainger’s (1988) account of ‘management control and labour 
quiescence: shopfloor politics at Alfred Herbert’s, 1945-1980’.  
Box 3-worker adversarialism: Workers choose to maximize their interests at the expense of 
employers who follow the golden rule. Here, workers may see little point in sharing information or 
cooperating with management. Thus workers gain at management’s expense. A classic case fitting 
box 3 could be Melman’s (1958) account of worker job controls in 'Decision Making and 
Productivity'.  
Box 4-mutual losses: Both employers and workers choose to maximize their own separate interests, 
and neither follow the golden rule of mutual cooperation, in the belief the other side will fail to 
reciprocate and instead will seek individual gain. This is the prisoner’s dilemma zero-sum outcome, 
because if both parties choose to maximize their own interests, mutual losses often result from 
reciprocal non-cooperation. A classic case fitting box 4 could be Alhstrand’s (1990) case study of 
the quest for productivity at the Fawley oil refinery.  
 
Box 1 is the only possible route to Pareto optimal cooperative mutuality. Given it is a zero-sum 
game no one can be made better off without making the other worse off by moving to boxes 2, 3 or 
4. Proposition 2 below advances the idea that the permissive design of the ICD and minimalist 
transposition of national I&C regulations in LMEs will tend to encourage maximization of 
employer gains (box 2) or mutual losses (box 4), rather than mutual cooperative gains (box 1). In 
other words, the dominant options in the direction of adversarial individual self-maximizing 
behaviours reduce scope for win-win mutual cooperation (Leibenstein, 1982).  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 14 
 
 
P2: Game theory and the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma is useful for explaining why ‘light 
touch’ design of the both the ICD at EU level and minimalist national level I&C laws in LMEs 
continues tendencies at workplace level towards employer gains or mutual losses, more than 
mutual gains. 
 
Uncertainty, risk and sustainability 
Proposition three relates to how uncertainty of outcomes associated with game theory/the prisoners 
dilemma in LME contexts often renders I&C as high risk and unsustainable. Some scholars have 
correctly cautioned against drawing overly sharp ‘ideal type’ distinctions between Liberal Market 
Economies and Coordinated Market Economies (Wood et al., 2014). Within CMEs, for instance, 
not all countries are characterised by hard statutory voice regulation, with Swedish and Danish 
employment relations characterised by high levels of voluntarism, but with high trade union and 
collective bargaining coverage encouraging high levels of bargained cooperation between trade 
unions and employer associations (Gallie, 2009). Meanwhile, adversarial traditions in CMEs like 
France raise some doubts about the effectiveness of stronger state imposed rules for ensuring 
cooperation at firm level (Goetschy and Jobert, 2011). With regard to LMEs there are institutional 
differences. For example, Ireland had centralized social pacts between 1987 and 2009, whereas the 
UK has had no history of such pacts apart from the failed ‘Social Contract’ in the 1970s 
(McDonough and Dundon, 2010). Further, even light touch legally-backed consultative employee 
voice structures remain unpalatable to many in other LME contexts like the USA, where there is 
vehement opposition to collectivism (Patmore, 2010).  
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Notwithstanding these observations, outcomes in the four boxes in Table 1 above are clearly 
influenced by different national institutional contexts, and various scholars question the capacity of 
liberalized market-driven economies with voluntarist systems like the UK and Ireland to nurture 
and sustain cooperative workplace coalitions in the long-run (Authors2; Brewster et al., 2014). In 
the contemporary voluntarist systems of the UK and Ireland, employees are reliant on managerial 
goodwill to both develop and sustain cooperative arrangements, and this will only continue as long 
as employer interests are met. Voluntarist cooperation entails risk for both parties to the 
employment relationship: risk to employees of being weakened organisationally and offering 
concessions in pursuit of partnership with management, and risk for employers due to the 
requirement to accommodate the encroachment of mutual gains on the traditional terrain of 
managerial prerogative (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005). 
 
 In comparison, notwithstanding debate about destabilizing pressures and dualities confronting 
coordinated market economies like Germany (Hassel 2014), some CMEs still institutionalize robust 
voice rights for many workers, provide more symmetrical access to information sharing between 
management and labour and more supportive conditions for insulating against risk and preserving 
cooperation over long-term time horizons relative to LMEs (Streeck, 1997; Authors2; Goergen et 
al., 2012; McLaughlin, 2013). For example, Leibenstein (1982:96-97) argues that in CMEs (say 
Germany) adversarial prisoner’s dilemma tendencies are reduced, because the institutional 
framework ‘shocks’ parties into repeatedly cooperating in longer-term productivity coalitions: 
... the latent prisoners’ dilemma possibilities are held in abeyance by conventions, institutions, and 
laws ….. If the adversarial options are absent, then the mutual choice is the optimal position...an 
effective low-cost system of laws which enforces contracts may minimize the inducement to use 
other types of adversarial behavior.   
 
However, workplace cooperation in LMEs (say the UK or RoI) entails higher risk of uncertainty 
because it is easier for parties to exit cooperative bargains, especially in an era of unstable 
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financialized capitalism (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Brewster et al., 2014; Thompson, 2013). 
Streeck (1997:201) warns that employer defections, even temporarily, from cooperative bargains 
with employees can lead to mistrust as workers question managements’ credibility: ‘the mere 
possibility of defection, as is by definition inherent in any voluntary arrangement, can dilute the 
positive effects of workplace cooperation’. Such perceptions of uncertainty of outcomes is 
exacerbated by the fact that access to information in LMEs for one side (employees) is often more 
limited and asymmetrical than for the other (employers) (Broome, 1989). Therefore, institutional 
context matters greatly for distributing gains and losses, and shaping the risks and lifespan 
associated with cooperation. Given the balance of power in LMEs typically favours employers, 
boxes 2 or 4 will be common (short-term) outcomes, with box 1 (long-term outcomes) being 
uncommon and unsustainable.  
P3: Perceived uncertainties of outcome associated with the prisoner’s dilemma mean that in LME 
contexts I&C arrangements will often be too high risk over the long-term for management and 
employees to sustain genuine mutual gains.  
 
Theorising around these propositions offers a useful new schematic metaphorical benchmark 
against which to analyse empirical data, summarised in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Research Methodology 
The empirical data is derived from a multiple case study design. Sixteen organizations located in 
different economic sectors that utilised a variety of employee voice mechanisms and displayed 
awareness of changes arising from European regulations for employee information and consultation 
were studied over a two year period. Sectors of the economy covered manufacturing, retail, 
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hospitality, and services. Of the 16 organizations, 8 had operations in both the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, which allowed institutional comparability. A further 4 had operations in the 
RoI exclusively, and the same sectors were matched with 4 cases that had NI-only operations. This 
provided for regulatory jurisdictional variability across two LMEs. A total of 33 sites were visited 
across the 16 cases (see Figure 1). Only organizations which employ over 50 workers were selected 
as this was the threshold application of the ICD. The cases are a mix of union and non-union, 
multinational and indigenous firms. Countries of ownership origin were as follows for the 16 case 
organizations: Ireland (6), UK (6), USA (2), Germany (1), Belgium (1). 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Case study findings were based largely on semi-structured interviews with management, union 
representatives, non-union representatives, and employees at each site. In all 33 sites, a minimum 
threshold of one senior manager, one HR manager, one line manager, two employee representatives 
and six employees were interviewed. In many organizations, a higher level of access was granted, 
and a total of 334 interviews were completed. The research involved multiple visits to companies 
during a two-year period. Documentary sources were also collected at each organization, notably 
data on I&C practices and general HR policies.   
 
The interview schedules were designed to collect empirical data relating to the three propositions. 
Questions about ‘level, scope and perceived depth’ of workforce consultation provided data in 
relation to proposition 1. For proposition 2 several questions sought respondent ‘knowledge and 
awareness of the ICE regulations’. In particular, multiple respondents were probed concerning the 
degree of possible mutuality from company arrangements for information-sharing and workforce 
consultation. Finally, for proposition 3, several questions explored respondent ‘experiences of 
related issues that affected I&C diffusion’, including external market pressures and internal issues 
concerned with employee trust and levels of participation. Taken together, the research design 
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provided qualitative data to capture possible degrees of risk associated with I&C arrangements over 
a sustained period of time - from the perspectives of local managers, union and non-union 
representatives, and employees themselves.  
 
Findings 
This section presents examples of empirical data to assess earlier propositions.  
 
Minimalist design of I&C 
 
P1: The intent of the EU ICD is to diffuse social dialogue and mutual trust at work. However, the 
‘degree, level and scope’ of employee voice falls short of this intent because of minimalist design of 
both the Directive itself and the transposed national I&C laws in LMEs, in particular.  
Influenced by the permissive design of both the EU ICD and minimalist national I&C provisions, 
the generalised finding for P1 is that in most cases efficacy of regulations to support social dialogue 
and mutual trust (as proclaimed in the Directive) at micro level was limited. In most workplaces, it 
was clear that management were intent on managing unilaterally and restricted employee voice. 
This general finding is evidenced across the jurisdictions of the UK (NI) and RoI, and in different 
sectors. However, relatively robust consultation rights were more likely to exist at the most strongly 
unionised sites (TransportCo in RoI and InsuranceCo in RoI), and less so in non-union sites. 
Regarding country of ownership origin, enduring employee voice arrangements were present at 
InsuranceCo, a German (CME) owned subsidiary – yet even here there were limits to consultative 
voice. Findings are elaborated from case examples below in relation to degree, level and scope of 
voice provision. 
 
i) Degree of I&C voice 
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Degree of I&C voice across the sixteen cases mainly amounts to either ‘one-way’ and/or ‘two-way’ 
information-sharing. Robust consultation, with a view to reaching agreement, was evident in a 
minority of cases with long-standing/strong union presence. For example, at TransportCo in RoI, 
there was a long history of strong trade unions, joint consultation committees and collective 
bargaining, which was reflected in union representatives being consulted about workplace change 
programmes. However, the degree and quality of I&C at TransportCo has evidently diminished 
somewhat as a result of serious competiveness problems facing the company in recent years. At 
InsuranceCo, union and employee representatives were informed and consulted by management 
through a Group Enterprise Forum (GEF), dating back to 1998. The GEF (whose membership 
comprised three senior managers, including the CEO, and eight employee representatives) 
displayed characteristics of robustness in the sense that it was the product of negotiations with 
employee representatives, was underpinned by an agreed written constitution outlining its functions 
and scope, and had an elected membership. A big factor was that the Irish subsidiary was German-
owned, so there was a culture of information and consultation in the parent organization, a factor 
mentioned by union representatives as being very important. But even at InsuranceCo, union 
representatives did suggest that information sharing and listening to feedback from representatives 
tended to be more common than formalised consultation with a view to reaching agreement, and 
they expressed a wish to be involved at earlier stages of decision-making processes. 
 
Such relatively robust arrangements were untypical across the other case organizations. BookCo, a 
long-established family-owned unionized company did not respond to the I&C legislation, 
preferring to rely on pre-existing collective bargaining and direct informal information-sharing 
channels, with very little consultation over workplace change. BritCo, a large employer in the 
services sector, operates on an all-island basis, but its depth of voice regimes differed across the two 
jurisdictions. In NI there is a history of unionised collective bargaining and joint consultation 
arrangements, whereas in ROI, where it acquired a non-union firm in 2000, a new non-union 
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employee representative (NER) forum was created in 2005, partly in response to the ICD. This 
NER forum offered ad hoc consultation, but was mostly an information sharing channel. In 
interviews, BritCo senior management admitted the NER forum was essentially a ‘tick the box 
exercise’ to be seen to comply with regulatory requirements. The forum was largely defunct by 
2006 as no meetings were held subsequently. From early 2007, unrest amongst BritCo employees in 
the Republic arose over corporate restructuring, culminating in a union organizing campaign. 
Management responded by re-calibrating and strengthening the previously defunct NER forum 
(rebranding it Vocal), while opposing union recognition.  
 
At a large multinational, ConcreteCo, there was clear duality in degree of voice regimes between 
ROI (unionised and elements of joint consultation) and NI (non-union and limited top-down 
information sharing). In NI, management simply did not consult workers: 
I think the word ‘consultation’ is a misnomer, it is very much communication…. Consultation 
implies there is a party with information, there is opportunity to give feedback on that information, 
feedback is listened to, and as a result decisions are taken. That does not happen here (ConcreteCo 
HR Manager, NI). 
 
In the ROI, compared to ConcreteCo’s NI operations, unions had more influence over power-
sharing owing to pre-existing multi-union bargaining and consultation: something the senior HR 
manager called a ‘good system of information and consultation’.  
 
HolidayCo is a public sector organization in the hospitality industry that is partially unionized in 
ROI and non-union in NI. Informal direct communications dominate voice provision in NI. In ROI, 
there is a union Joint Consultative Council (JCC) meeting four times a year. HR management said 
pre-existing arrangements conformed with I&C legislation. HomeCo, a British-owned retail chain, 
has a long history of internal NER voice forums known as Bottom-Up, influenced by the company’s 
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non-union paternalism. Whilst senior management said Bottom-Up was designed to stimulate 
consultation, employee representatives believed that voice was restricted: 
 
You have an opportunity to voice an opinion, but whether any heed will be taken of that is 
  another thing altogether. (HomeCo Employee representative, NI)  
 
Evidently, NER forums were also a means of union avoidance/substitution: 
With the Forum, it was never explicit, but the company is not a unionised company . . . The 
Forum is a way of saying that we operate the type of culture that we would never want people to 
think they’d need a union. (HomeCo HRM Director, ROI). 
 
WindowsCo is a medium-sized family-owned firm in Northern Ireland, manufacturing window 
blinds. A non-union company, it initially had no formal voice system aside from individual 
grievance procedures. When seeking accreditation from Investors in People (IiP), the Northern 
Ireland Labour Relations Agency (LRA) helped the company establish a non-union ‘Employee 
Forum’ in 2005/6. However, the ‘Employee Forum’ did not develop a consultative depth. 
 
ii) Level of I&C voice 
In terms of level, data indicates that I&C exchanges mainly occur at lower organizational levels, 
typically mainly at task level, but with some examples of higher level worksite and company-wide 
communications. Employee representatives at InsuranceCo had access to I&C at company level 
through meetings with senior management. A similar situation applied at TransportCo, and (until 
the organization was privatized in 2006) there were worker directors on the board. At BookCo most 
information disseminated to employees occurred informally and directly in ‘walk and talk’ type 
situations on the shopfloor, with union representatives having little consultative influence at 
corporate headquarters level. In comparison, NER Vocal representatives at BritCo RoI experienced 
some higher company level voice through meetings with the Chief Executive and HR Director, as 
did unionised counterparts in NI. In ConcreteCo, the limited information sharing in the non-union 
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NI locale was mainly restricted to individual task level, whereas union representatives in ROI 
experienced periodic consultation at company level. Meanwhile, at HolidayCo, presence of the 
union JCC in RoI meant union representatives were periodically consulted at company level. In the 
non-union NI site, informal direct communications overwhelmingly occurred at task level. At 
HomeCo, there were supposed to be quarterly sequences of Bottom-Up NER forum meetings at 
multi-levels (store, regional, divisional, national): so that, where necessary, issues can be passed up 
the pyramid to national company level. In reality meetings were sporadic.  
 
iii) Scope of I&C voice 
Finally, scope of decision-making is mainly restricted to basic operational issues (like canteen 
menus, workplace layout), rather than ‘bigger’ strategic or employment contract related issues. 
Exceptions to this included InsuranceCo and TransportCo in RoI, where employee representatives 
were informed and consulted about key business and strategic issues by senior management on a 
regular basis. This was uncommon across the other cases. In BookCo, informal ‘walk and talk’ 
information exchange by managers mostly concerned day-to-day operational matters like book 
promotions. Confirming lack of scope for power-sharing, a shop manager was dismissive about 
company I&C provision, commenting that ‘no such systems exist’. Instead he described ‘The 
BookCo Way’, whereby senior management communicate informally on a ‘need to know basis’. 
Sometimes he felt Directors leaked proposals to see if they would ‘fly’. This manager felt there 
were downsides to ‘The BookCo Way’, notably lack of openness in senior managerial circles about 
big issues like budgets, strategy, and trading difficulties. Meanwhile, at BritCo, for a time the 
revamped NER forum in the Republic appeared to offer potential scope for more power sharing 
than hitherto: NER representatives were elected, monthly meetings occurred, and Vocal 
representatives received business updates from the HR Director and Chief Executive. However,  the 
reality was that management provided better information updates to representatives for a short time, 
but did not imbue power sharing in any meaningful sense. 
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In ConcreteCo, there is little scope for I&C at the non-union NI operations. In contrast, I&C in the 
unionized ROI periodically focuses on employment issues like redundancies, working time, and 
working conditions in specific sites. But meetings are ad hoc and issue-driven: they ‘only occur 
when something arises’ (manager, ROI). Further, union representatives said management often 
presented decisions as a fait accompli, restricting scope of consultative power-sharing: 
You get the sense that decisions are already made at a higher level, then the unions are told. Unions 
don’t have real influence, say if new machinery or work practices come in. (ConcreteCo Union 
Steward, ROI) 
 
It was suggested that the ‘Employee Forum’ at WindowsCo was based on the standard provisions of 
the UK ICE Regulations. The HRM team admitted that, in its early years, the NER Forum played a 
negligible role in company governance, limited to health and safety considerations. The NER was 
later reinvigorated, influenced by what the Chief Executive called an ‘aggressive’ union recognition 
campaign, and management acknowledged that underlying grievances existed. Yet scope for 
consultative power-sharing remained shallow. 
 
Game theory and unequal outcomes 
  
P2: Game theory and the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma is useful for explaining why ‘light 
touch’ design of the ICD and minimalist national I&C laws in LMEs continues tendencies at 
workplace level towards employer gains or mutual losses, more than mutual gains. 
Confirming proposition two, the selected case examples below illustrate that micro-level I&C 
arrangements tended to generate adversarial non-cooperative outcomes (as in Table 1 earlier): 
usually gains only for management (box 2), or mutual losses (box 4). In the few instances where 
mutuality occurred (box 1), it was constrained mutuality, and was usually restricted to strongly 
unionized workplaces where workers were collectively organized, including InsuranceCo and 
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TransportCo in RoI. At InsuranceCo, a sophisticated knowledge-based organization, both parties 
indicated that effective I&C had generating some mutual gains through enabling a positive 
contribution to increased employee commitment, improving employee awareness of business 
objectives, more flexible working practices, encouraging a more participatory approach to decision-
making, enhancing employee voice and supporting a cooperative industrial relations climate. At 
TransportCo, while there has been a history of mutual gains, this has been in sharp abeyance in 
recent years as the company encountered serious competitive difficulties, which sparked adversarial 
industrial relations and a number of industrial disputes. 
 
At HolidayCo, a constrained form of mutual gains occurred through the unionized JCC in RoI. 
Indeed, both management and union representatives recognized the value of proactive consultation 
with a view to reaching agreement. JCC union representatives were consulted and had real 
influence designing mutually beneficial new flexible work practices (flexi-time, time off in lieu), 
subsequently implemented across the organization: 
People can end up working long hours, so we put in place, in full consultation, measures to manage 
working hours. We did that through a whole range of working time arrangements ..flexi hours, time 
off in lieu..Policies were drawn up in consultation with the JCC and wider staff. (HR manager, ROI) 
   
At BritCo, there was initially partial evidence of cooperative mutual gains through the reconfigured 
NER Vocal forum; albeit a constrained mutuality distributing limited independent power to 
employee representatives. Partial harmonization of company redundancy terms in RoI relative to NI 
was the main mutual gain; namely that aspects of Northern Irish redundancy terms were replicated 
in the Republic: including parity of redundancy payments, and a redundancy pool wherein 
employees at risk of losing their jobs were given opportunities to secure new positions within 
BritCo. Management benefited insofar as it enabled them to draw the sting from a contentious issue 
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behind union organising, thereby facilitating union avoidance. For employees, articulating concerns 
over redundancy and being afforded a consultative role, improved redundancy outcomes.   
 
More generally across the case organizations, outcomes tend to be asymmetrical and unequal, with 
employees often experiencing limited gains. At BookCo, there was a mix of management only gains 
(box 2) focused on profit maximization, as well as mutual losses (box 4), which were starkly 
evident when senior management introduced new technology (a picking and dispatch machine) in a 
warehouse without consulting or seeking input from employees or unions. Senior management 
believed that new technology would improve efficiency. Yet it was a disaster on introduction with 
numerous teething problems and external technicians had to be brought on site for 6 months 
'tweaking' the machine, at considerable cost. At ConcreteCo NI, employees experienced losses, 
bemoaning the lack of say, but employers gained because the lack of I&C saved costs. Management 
had negative opinions of I&C: 
We know about the kinds of structures you could have but from an employer’s point of view, what is 
the benefit? I know the cost that would arise from them. The structures that we have are negligible. 
(HR Manager, Concrete Co NI) 
 
At HomeCo, management only gains in terms of profit maximization, or mutual losses for 
management and employees, were more evident than mutual gains. For instance, a RoI HRM 
Director felt Bottom-up generated few business gains: 
Does Bottom-Up improve the business? I don’t think in its current format it truly does. If you 
look at improving the business as not having problems, then it does in some way do that. It prevents 
something else from being created that could hinder the business. But it is quite downloady, 
business-led and almost management having responses in advance of what the questions are.  
 
Although HomeCo senior management did evince aspirations that NER forums might become a 
space where employees could contribute ideas on sales or customer service, in reality, they were 
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largely used for conflict displacement rather than collaborative problem-solving. Store level 
managers complained that employees mainly used forums ‘negatively’ to advance grievances on 
issues like store-level heating. Yet, employee representatives at HomeCo were sceptical of the NER 
scheme’s utility for even resolving grievances, describing, in particular, problems with excess heat 
in stores that had been raised repeatedly at all forum levels. But management reportedly refrained 
from acting until employees referred the matter externally to the Health and Safety Authority 
(HSA), which issued the company with an enforcement notice. 
 
At WindowsCo, the NER amounted to management acting on grievances rather than parties 
collaborating to improve quality of joint solutions. Indeed the CEO and HRM team complained that 
employees saw the forum as a ‘dumping ground’ for grievances and articulated a desire that 
employees would contribute ideas to ‘add value’ to the business, such as improving product quality. 
On balance, outcomes at WindowsCo were characterized by employer only gains (box 2) and 
mutual losses (box 4). 
 
Risk, uncertainty and sustainability  
P3: Perceived uncertainties of outcome associated with the prisoner’s dilemma mean that in LME 
contexts I&C arrangements will be too high risk over the long-term for management and employees 
to sustain genuine mutual gains.  
In line with proposition three, rare instances of mutual gains cooperation (box 1) like those at 
BritCo and HolidayCo were not sustained in voluntarist contexts, while mutual gains at 
TransportCo had been decimated by serious competitive problems. InsuranceCo, a German-owned 
knowledge intensive company was perhaps the only one of our sixteen case organizations were 
elements of mutual gains had endured. A crucial distinguishing factor at InsuranceCo was a 
managerial mind-set that increasingly recognized the need to articulate to employees the rationale 
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behind key organizational decisions to secure workforce consent and reduce uncertainties of 
outcome. Elsewhere, at BritCo, the union was adamant that the NER Vocal forum in the Republic 
was driven by ‘a tried and tested union avoidance formula’. Given this industrial relations climate, 
cooperative mutuality did not endure, with cooperation soon dissipating into reciprocated mistrust 
and adversarialism. Indeed, once the momentum of the union campaign subsided, mutual gains 
arising from Vocal narrowed after a brief time-span. Many employee respondents felt Vocal 
degenerated into an ineffective ‘talking-shop’, dealing with trivial ‘tea and toilet’ type decisions 
rather than offering consultation over more substantive issues. Three employee representatives 
subsequently resigned from Vocal, believing it had become ‘toothless’. As proposition 3 theorises, 
this union avoidance strategy meant that mutual adversarialism supplanted mutual cooperation. 
 
In BookCo, significant levels of risk and adversarial mistrust militated against information sharing 
and cooperation in the long-run, exemplified by fall-out from failure to consult about new 
technology. It was clear that the company management had little interest in developing a more 
cooperative type of employment relations and the workforce seemed relatively powerless to change 
this. In HomeCo, growing dissatisfaction meant many employees bypassed NER forums, instead 
raising grievances with line managers, or external institutions. At WindowsCo, competitive 
pressures and associated uncertainties of outcome after the 2008 recession explained why I&C 
arrangements delivered insufficient gains for management, and particularly employees, and its 
functionality eroded over time. This sharply impacted on shopfloor I&C practice: 
Horrible pressure, loads of stress, targets. It feels that management couldn’t care less about their 
workforce or their views or opinions, just as long as their targets are being met. (Production 
employee, WindowsCo) 
 
Aside perhaps from German-owned, knowledge-intensive InsuranceCo, these examples confirm 
proposition three and illustrate that uncertainties of outcome linked to low trust prisoner’s dilemma 
tendencies in LMEs means that cooperative I&C arrangements are high risk and hard to sustain in 
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voluntarist contexts, with reversion to adversarialism a common occurrence. In summary, the 
evidence depicts the important interplay between multi-level macro and micro factors affecting I&C 
arrangements. Confronted with minimal regulatory constraints from State apparatuses, management 
generally tended to opt to consolidate their power position rather than share it with other workplace 
stakeholders. Yet there were some important micro-level contextual differences in voice provision 
across the cases, which were variously influenced by whether operations were located in the RoI or 
NI, the sector or industry, competitive strategy (quality knowledge intensive versus low cost), 
whether they were strongly unionised or non-union (which influences how independent I&C 
provisions are from management), management style, industrial relations climate, and country of 
origin. Therefore, even within a generally ‘hostile’ external regulatory context for I&C, different 
plant-level factors play a role in shaping organizational voice arrangements. This is illustrated by 
examples of empirical case findings summarized in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
   
Discussion and conclusion 
This article examined the multi-level institutional governance interface (Jackson and Deeg, 2012) 
between EU social policy (the Information & Consultation Directive, ICD), transposition by the 
nation state, and implications for employee voice rights at organizational level. The ICD has been 
largely ineffective in enhancing what the ILO calls ‘representation security’ in the liberal market 
economies of the UK and RoI, evidenced, in particular, by minimalist design of the transposed 
national-level legal and regulatory frameworks for diffusing I&C voice, as well as employer 
domination at organizational level of collective representative bodies in our cases.  
While offering important empirical insights, previous studies assessing impacts of the European 
I&C Directive in liberal economies (Taylor et al., 2009; Hall et al., 2013, 2015) have lacked a 
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theoretical perspective to explain regulatory ineffectiveness. This article fills that gap by offering 
important theoretical and empirical contributions, including using game theory to explain why the 
implementing legislations have been largely ineffective in diffusing employee voice, ‘representative 
security’ and mutual gains cooperation at workplaces in the UK (Northern Ireland) and Republic of 
Ireland. Three explanatory theoretical propositions have been advanced, and related implications 
are now discussed. 
 
Institutional design matters  
The first proposition raises implications concerning the importance of institutional design. 
Negligible impact of I&C legislation in the UK and RoI is not an accident. As the ICD has been 
designed in a light touch way at EU level and subsequently transposed in a minimalist manner at 
national level, efficacy of I&C legislation to support social dialogue and mutual cooperation 
through democratic employee voice rights falls short of the original spirit of the Directive. Light 
touch design of the final Directive that emerged in 2002 and transposed national regulations in the 
two LMEs was influenced by repeated employer lobbying, and governments’ in both the UK and 
Ireland were receptive to upholding managerial choice given explicit political endorsements of 
flexible deregulated labour markets. National unions in the UK and RoI, meanwhile, largely vacated 
the regulatory space, partly because they saw I&C regulations as potentially being used to 
undermine collective bargaining. The upshot was that employers ‘captured’ the I&C legislative 
agenda and ensured their preferences were not unduly endangered by what they saw as alien 
regulatory interference and collectivism. Hall et al., (2015) also observe that the UK ICE 
regulations have not really altered employer I&C arrangements and union engagement is limited.  
In our cases, the transposed regulations were for the most part too weak to pressure employers to 
change their behaviour. The case examples show that while in some instances employers were 
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cognizant of complying with the ICD (e.g. InsuranceCo, BritCo, HomeCo, HolidayCo), they were 
able to carve their own preferred organizational-specific I&C bodies given the minimal mandatory 
reach of national implementing laws. Further, presence of I&C legislation was apparently often a 
secondary factor driving redesign of workplace I&C, with union avoidance considerations 
prominent in some cases (e.g. BritCo, WindowsCo, HomeCo). Various case organizations claimed 
to have pre-existing arrangements which management felt did not require modification in response 
to the ICD (e.g. ConcreteCo (RoI), HolidayCo), and others simply ignored the regulations (e.g. 
BookCo). Overall, the efficacy of national regulations to support social dialogue and mutual trust 
was limited across most cases, as measured by the themes of degree, level, and scope of I&C voice. 
Firstly, aside from isolated ad hoc examples of issue-based consultation (e.g. BritCo, HolidayCo), 
the degree of employee voice mainly consisted of managerial controlled information-sharing. 
Secondly, I&C mainly occurred at lower organizational levels, although there were exceptions at 
companies like InsuranceCo and TransportCo in RoI, where extensive company-level I&C 
occurred. Finally, apart from some cases where there was some consultation over business and 
employment-related issues (e.g. InsuranceCo, key business and financial issues; BritCo, 
redundancy; HolidayCo, flexible working), the scope of issues on which employees could articulate 
interests was largely confined to basic operational matters like canteen menus or workplace layout. 
There was limited robust consultation with a view to reaching agreement over ‘big ticket’ strategic 
issues across all the case organizations.  
 
Game theory and non-cooperative outcomes 
In advancing the second proposition, we illustrated theoretically and empirically that light touch 
design of the ICD and implementing I&C legislation in the permissive voluntarist economies of the 
UK and RoI facilitated adversarial employer gains and/or mutual losses, much more than 
cooperative mutual gains outcomes, across the case organizations (see tables 1, 2 and 3). The main 
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exception was InsuranceCo, a German-owned knowledge intensive firm, where there were 
elements of cooperative mutual gains; supported by the consensual industrial relations culture of the 
German parent multinational. Game theory/the prisoner’s dilemma concept shows why two parties 
might not cooperate in pursuit of mutual gains choices and outcomes, even if it actually might be 
mutually beneficial to do so. This article illustrates why prisoner’s dilemma tendencies are common 
in LME contexts, which results in adversarialism and mistrust dominating over mutuality 
(Leibenstein, 1982; Trif and Brady, 2013). When combined with sociological and industrial 
relations analysis, game theory/PD can provide a benchmark to illustrate key processes shaping 
choices that may encourage tendencies towards particular outcomes (employer gains/mutual 
losses/non-cooperation/adversarialism) more than others (mutual gains/cooperation).  
Confirming proposition two, therefore, aside from InsuranceCo, the selected case examples 
illustrated that micro-level I&C arrangements tended to generate adversarial non-cooperative 
outcomes: either gains for managers at the expense of losses for employees (box 2), or mutual 
losses for both parties (box 4). The prisoner’s dilemma problem was most clearly exemplified in 
case organizations by instances when mutual losses resulted from mutually reciprocated 
adversarialism. Serious lose-lose outcomes resulting from senior management’s unilateral 
introduction of new technology at BookCo without consulting or informing workers was a stark 
example.  
The data is also illustrative of weaknesses in labour or personnel economics’ application of ideas 
like game theory, which seek to quantify and reduce complex human agency choices to so-called 
scientific measures or econometric models (Lazear, 2000a&b; Edwards, 2012; Spencer, 2012). In 
contrast, we advance a more sociological industrial relations strain of analysis to game theorising 
processes capturing actor choice over voice, reflecting ambiguities of power, tensions between 
conflict and cooperation, and the many dimensions of employee participation. We therefore 
contextualise game theory/the prisoner’s dilemma in a more nuanced qualitative way to illustrate 
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why low trust lose-lose outcomes, and/or employer only gains, tend to be much more common in 
reality in LME contexts than idealised win-win mutual trust relations between management and 
labour based on robust social dialogue – the stated objective in the EU IC Directive. 
 
Voluntary mutuality is high risk and unsustainable 
Proposition three argues that in LME contexts where there is perceived uncertainty about future 
outcomes, there is high probability that I&C arrangements will be very risky for employers and/or 
employees, and unsustainable over the long-term (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005). That is to say, 
in voluntarist contexts, either or both parties will eventually be encouraged to pursue maximum 
(individual) short-term self-interest rather than (collectivist) longer-term mutuality. Rare instances 
of mutual gains cooperation (box 1 in table 1) evident in our cases (e.g. BritCo, HolidayCo) were 
isolated examples of ‘constrained mutuality’ that were not repeated and/or sustained over time. The 
notable exception was InsuranceCo, where management explicitly recognized the need to engage 
employee representatives in dialogue to articulate the rationale behind key business decisions and 
thereby reduce uncertainty of outcomes. Again, this may be partly attributable to the subsidiary 
being German-owned, a fact which employee representatives mentioned frequently.    
 
In summary, the evidence from our case organizations shows that a light touch macro-level 
regulatory framework governing I&C rights at work did not have sufficient ‘legal bite’ to ‘shock’ 
employers to invoke stronger consultation arrangements. However, we can pinpoint some 
significant micro-level contextual differences affecting voice provision across the case 
organizations, including: country location (RoI or NI/UK), sector or industry, competitive strategy 
(value-added knowledge intensive or low price), intensity of competitive pressures, strong 
unionisation or non-union (impacts on robustness/independence from management), management 
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style (participative or coercive), industrial relations climate (cooperative or adversarial), and parent 
company country of origin (LME or CME). Therefore, while the external regulatory environment is 
clearly unfavourable for embedding effective and enduring I&C arrangements, this does not totally 
determine organizational level employee voice because there remains an element of strategic 
choice, evidenced by variation within and between our case organizations. 
 
Social policy implications 
What are the social policy implications for the ICD and national implementing legislation? Labour 
is too weak and the ICD is clearly too ineffective in LME contexts for diffusing employee voice 
rights and ‘representation security’ at work as a widely applicable framework of European labour 
law. Therefore, re-regulation of I&C laws at European and nation state levels would be a necessary 
(albeit partial) solution to the prisoner’s dilemma through external institutionalization of hard 
‘beneficial constraints’ by the state to absorb the risks of collaborating and compel parties to share 
information and cooperate over longer-term time horizons (Streeck, 1992, 1997; McLaughlin, 
2013). Streeck (1992:323-328) is clear that a voluntary political and industrial order by definition 
lacks capacity to ‘sustain equitable cooperation between capital and labor’. Rather, sustainable 
cooperation requires the state to impose non-voluntary legally binding constraints and publically 
enforceable obligations on parties for the democratic good of society, while constraining freedom of 
private choice to some extent. Otherwise there is insufficient trust and cooperation often unravels, 
especially if employers, like some of our case organizations (e.g. WindowsCo, TransportCo, 
EngineerCo), can easily defect in response to short-term market fluctuations and competitive 
pressures that are acute under disconnected financialized capitalism (Thompson, 2013). In a recent 
‘fitness check’ on EU information and consultation laws, the European Commission (2013) 
acknowledged some shortcomings with regard to effectiveness (including lack of coverage of I&C 
bodies and limited consultation, notably where employees have to ‘opt-in’ to apply for I&C rights), 
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yet stopped short of proposing ‘harder’ re-regulation that might make employee I&C rights more 
accessible, robust and enduring, especially in LMEs. In fact, as noted in this journal, the recent 
period has been associated with a dramatic marginalization of EU social policy, with neo-liberalized 
macroeconomic and financial issues increasingly in the ascendancy (Barbier, 2012).     
 
But harder regulation and state imposed rules alone are unlikely to be sufficient to reduce 
adversarial mistrust and uncertainty about employer and employee behaviours at work. France is an 
example of a CME with stronger state backed regulations for works councils, but its deep-rooted 
adversarial traditions apparently limit potential for cooperation at workplace level (Goetschy and 
Jobert, 2011). The upshot is that there would need to be (unlikely) major cultural and ideological 
shifts in historically enduring management attitudes away from unilateral managerial prerogative 
towards cooperation with employee representatives and recognizing the benefits of good industrial 
relations and mutual trust. Yet it will be very difficult to break free from historically and culturally 
embedded pathways of low trust work orientations (Purcell, 1981; Fox, 1985). 
 
Conclusion 
Existing social policy regarding I&C legislation in LMEs is too weak to prompt employers to 
embed ‘representation security’, enduring cooperative mutuality, and support more stable and 
equitable risk sharing relationships between capital and labour, as our case data shows. 
Adversarialism and non-cooperative outcomes will probably continue to dominate local choices 
over employee I&C in voluntarist economies. Given the grip of neo-liberal orthodoxy, few 
politicians or employers in LMEs appear receptive to any re-regulation of industrial democracy 
interpreted as challenging managerial prerogative (Wright, 2004). Moreover, re-regulation of the 
ICD is likely to be ineffective as a standalone intervention given the dominant ideology of 
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managerial prerogative and a hostile wider political economy context of short-term financialized 
capitalism, which is not conducive to enduring cooperative mutuality (Thompson, 2013). To 
compete in liberalized political economies like the UK, cost reduction is often the default profit 
accumulation approach of many employers, who simply may not require high levels of sustained 
cooperative mutuality and pluralism to achieve this (Godard, 2004). 
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Table 1 – Game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma: losses & gains from I&C 
 Employer: Golden 
Rule 
Employer: Individual 
Maximization 
Worker: 
Golden Rule 
Box 1: 
Mutual gains 
cooperation. 
 
 
Win (E) Win (W) 
Box 2: 
Non-cooperation - 
gains for employer, 
workers lose. 
 
Win (E) Lose (W) 
Worker: 
Individual 
Maximization 
Box 3: 
Non-cooperation - 
gains for workers, 
employers lose. 
 
Win (W) Lose (E) 
Box 4: 
Non-cooperation - 
Mutual losses for all. 
Prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
Lose (E) Lose (W) 
(adapted from Leibenstein, 1982) 
 
Table 2 – Framework to assess impacts of I&C regulations on workplace I&C 
Design of I&C 
 
 
 
Power sharing 
elements of I&C  
 
Degree 
Level 
Scope 
 
 
 
Outcomes  
 
 
 
Mutual losses to 
mutual gains (boxes 1-
4 in table 1) 
 
 
Timeframe 
(durability) and risk 
 
 
Short to longer-term 
 
Low to high risk 
Contextual and 
regulatory supports 
or barriers 
 
Internal voluntarist 
employer initiated 
voice versus external 
regulated beneficial 
constraints. 
 
Competitive factors: 
extent of 
uncertainty/turbulence, 
cost competition or 
quality competition. 
 
Sector 
 
General IR climate/ 
union presence/ 
management style. 
 
Country of origin 
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Table 3 – Empirical examples from case studies 
Design of I&C 
 
 
Power sharing elements 
of I&C  
 
Degree, Level Scope 
Outcomes  
 
 
Mutual losses to mutual 
gains 
 
 
Timeframe and risk 
 
 
Short to longer-term 
Low to high risk 
Contextual & 
regulatory supports or 
barriers 
Voluntarism versus 
regulated beneficial 
constraints,  
Competitive factors 
Sector 
IR climate  
Country of origin  
Case examples 
 
InsuranceCo: enduring 
support for I&C by mgt. 
 
 
 
TransportCo: long 
history of robust I&C, but 
under threat/attack. 
 
BookCo: Ignored I&C 
laws, informal 
information-sharing on 
‘need to know basis’ 
(‘The BookCo Way’) 
 
BritCo: reacted to I&C 
laws, unionised I&C in 
NI, non-union in South 
(Vocal NER forum) 
 
ConcreteCo: pre-existing 
I&C: traditional union 
I&C in ROI, weak non-
union direct 
communications in NI. 
 
HolidayCo: partially 
unionized JCC in ROI, 
non-union informal direct 
communications in NI. 
 
 
 
 
HomeCo: multi-level 
NER forums. Reacted to 
I&C laws but not robust 
consultation/ power-
sharing. Mainly 
information provision.  
 
WindowsCo: non-union 
NER, downward 
communication, not  
consultation. 
Case examples 
 
Elements of mutual gains 
 
 
 
 
Historical mutual gains, 
but decimated by 
competitive pressures, 
employer only gains. 
 
Employer gains, 
employees lose. Also 
lose-lose outcomes when 
introducing new 
technology. 
 
Employer gains, 
employees lose. One-off 
episode of mutual gains   
 
 
No benefits associated 
with I&C in NI. 
Employer gain from low 
cost of I&C, employees 
lose.  
 
Some mutual gains in 
ROI: union reps helped 
design new flexible work 
arrangements. Both 
parties saw benefit to 
good I&C. But ad hoc 
‘constrained mutuality’ 
 
 
Mix of employer win-
employees lose, and 
mutual lose-lose 
 
 
 
Mainly employer win, 
employees lose, or lose-
lose. 
Case examples 
 
Longer-term. Explicit 
care to reduce uncertainty 
 
 
 
High risk: competitive 
pressures 
 
 
 
 
 
High risk, no cooperation 
to sustain. 
 
 
High risk. Cooperation 
not sustainable. Mutual 
gains narrowed over short 
time-span. 
 
 
High risk, no cooperation 
to sustain in NI.  
 
 
 
 
JCC sustained over quite 
long time, but 
consultation intermittent. 
 
 
 
 
High risk. NER sustained 
for a long time, but was 
waning because not 
delivering for employees, 
or employer. 
 
High risk. Not sustainable 
– forum apparently 
displaced by employee 
recourse to line 
managers. 
Case examples 
 
German-owned firm. 
Cooperative IR 
climate/culture. Strong 
union. 
 
Severe competitive 
pressures undermining 
historically robust I&C = 
adversarial IR, frequent 
disputes. 
 
Voluntarism. Severe 
competitive 
pressures/cost 
competition. Union weak. 
 
Voluntarism. NER forum: 
employer response to 
union campaign in ROI 
(union avoidance). 
 
Voluntarism. Competitive 
pressures in construction. 
Union in ROI gave 
stronger voice than NI. 
 
 
 
Voluntarism. Positive IR 
climate. Union legacy in 
ROI. 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntarism. Paternalist 
history. Union avoidance. 
 
 
 
Family firm. Severe 
competitive pressures, 
work intensification. 
Union avoidance. 
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Figure 1 
SECTORS RoI NI ALL ISLAND ALL ISLAND 
SITES 
VISITED TOTAL 
Retail ShopCo (x1) 
Department 
Store (x1) BookCo (x3) HomeCo (x2) 7 4 
Manufacturing EngineerCo (x1) WindowsCo (x1) ConcreteCo (x3) 
 
TechnologyCo(x2) 7 4 
Services InsuranceCo(x1) 
Financial 
Services Inc (x1) BritCo (x3) TransportCo (x2) 7 4 
Hospitality South Hotel (x1) North Hotel (x1) HolidayCo (x2) CateringCo (x8) 12 4 
TOTALS 
    
33 16 
 
 
